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LIES, DAMN LIES, AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING: THE
ROLE OF CONSUMER SURVEYS IN THE WAKE OF MEAD
JOHNSON v. ABBOTT LABS
"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics."'
Just as Benjamin Disraeli noted, statistics yield results that one
can skew in a variety of ways. If Disraeli was around to observe
American society in the second half of the twentieth century, he
might have included another category in his list of lies: advertising.
Advertising, like statistics, is recognized commonly as a medium
where facts can be interpreted, twisted, and emphasized according
to the advertiser's needs. When businessjudgment and professional
ethics fail to enforce reasonable standards, the courts may have to
decide if advertisers have twisted the facts too far. This Note
examines how courts determine what constitutes misleading advertising and applauds the shift toward a more consistent judicial
doctrine signaled by the Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit in
2
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories.
Advertising plays a significant role in today's economy and its
presence in both print and electronic formats is likely to continue.
Buoyed by a strong market in 1999, advertisers increased their
media expenditures by 10.3 percent over 1998 spending levels up to
$87.5 billion from $79.3 billion." With that kind of money in
question, advertisers understandably want to get the highest possible return from their investment.
1. THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 249 (Angela Partington ed., 4th rev. ed.
1996) (citing 1 MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924) and attributing the quote to
Benjamin Disraeli).
2. 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir.2000), opinionamended on denialofreh'g,209 F.3d 1032 (7th

Cir. 2000).
3. See, e.g., Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc., Trends in Advertising: Estimated

Annual U.S. Advertising Expenditures 1998-1999, at http:/www.tvb.org/tvfacts/trends/
advolume/1998_1999.html (last visited Oct. 3,2001) (showing total advertising expenditures
for all media increasing 7.5%in 1998 and 6.8 percent in 1999).
4. Competitive Media Reporting, 1999 Ad Spending: GM, Cable Networks and the
Internet are the Winners (March 29, 2000), at www.cmr.comtnews/032900_2.html.
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Advertisers want to make their products look as good as
possible to as many consumers as possible. In today's market, they
frequently attempt the task not just by saying"our product is good,"
but by saying "our product is better than the other guys"--which is
the basic concept behind comparative advertising.5 The effectiveness of comparative advertising is shown not only by consumer
studies, but by its continuing use by advertisers. Approximately
one-third of all advertising in the United States is comparative.6 A
1994 study of 5000 commercials by Research Systems Corporation
(RSC) found that twenty-one percent of comparative ads had
"superior" persuasion scores whereas only eighteen percent of the
commercials that did not compare the competition received superior
scores.7 Comparative advertisements also lead to greater consumer
attention and message recall than noncomparative advertisements.'
American consumers typically can recognize when advertisers
make thinly veiled attempts to create an artificial advantage. 9
In these instances, exaggerated advertising or boasting upon which
no reasonable consumer would rely is not grounds for legal action.10
The term for this type of representation and manipulation of
advertising statistics is "puffing."" The advertiser's object in
puffing is simple: given a choice of data, pick those that make you
look best; if there is no good choice, change the criteria to make the
data support your product.'2 One of the more intriguing examples
5. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27:59 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the tendency of advertisers to claim superior
quality of their own product relative to the product of their competitors).
6. JennaD. Belier, Comment, The Law ofComparativeAdvertisinginthe UnitedStates
andAroundthe World:A PracticalGuide for U.S. Lawyers and Their Clients, 29 INT'L LAW.

917, 920 (1995).
7. Do TV Commercials Which Attack the Competition Pay Off? New Research Systems
Corp. Study of 5,000 CommercialsSays ComparativeAds Have a Slightly Better Chance of

Achieving Success, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20, 1994, availableat LEXIS, News Group File.
8. Beller, supra note 6, at 920.
9. For example, in 2000, Breyer's Ice Cream packaged new novelty flavors in slightly
less than the typicalhalf-gallon volume and promoted the change as a "new convenient size."
10. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 27:38.

11. Id.
12. See, e.g., David Pogue, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: You CanFindNumbers that
Say Anything-Especially if You Make 'Em Up, MACWORLD, Jun. 1999, at 180 (citing
estimates of Internet use as 38, 53 and 73 million by various research firms), availableat
http://www.macworld.com/1999/06/opinion/desktopcritic.html; Allan Lee, Broadcasting:"Lies,
Damn Lies and Statistics", (July 18, 2000), at http:/www.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/
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of puffing occurred in the computer industry's market-share
calculations. The research firm PC Data tallied each color of Apple's
popular iMac computer as a different model, thus ensuring that
only the competing Windows/Intel models attained best-seller
3
status.'
The effectiveness of an advertisement claiming that a given
product is better than its competitors increases when the ad cites
a scientific study or test to "establish" the claim." The modern
consumer often grants a position of "mystic infallibility" to information labeled as "scientifically proven.""3 Given the effectiveness
of claims with scientific support, advertisers will, perhaps understandably, tout the smallest nuances of established superiority to
gain a perceived competitive advantage.
When advertisers' claims cross the line from puffing to actual
falsity, enforcement of the laws of unfair competition is available to
injured parties. 6 There are a variety of legal options, 7 but the
predominant legislation for addressing charges of false advertising
-and the legal focus of this Note--is Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 18

broadcasting43906 ("Whoever it was coined the phrase about lies and statistics must have
been thinking about broadcast ratings. Radio and TV shows live or die at the hand of the
ratingS.).
13. Wes George,Divide&Conquer AprilNumbersReadAwry,THEMAC OBSERVFR, May
24, 1999, at http/Avww.macobserver.com/columns/appletrader/99/may/990524.html.
14. See, e.g., Jerry B. Gotlieb & Dan Sarel, ComparativeAdvertising Effectiveness: The
Role ofInvolvement and Source Credibility, 20 J.OF ADVER. 38, 44 (1991) (stating that the
effectiveness of comparative advertising increases when "a source of higher credibility [e.g.,
science] is included in the advertisement").
15. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Charles J. Walsh &
Marc S. Klein, FromDog Food to PrescriptionDrugAdvertising:LitigatingFalse Scientific
Establishment Claims under the LanhamAct, 22 SETON HALLL. REv. 389, 392 (1992).
16. 4 MCCARTHY, supranote 5, § 27:38.
17. Other options for false advertising litigation include federally prosecuted actions
under Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52 (1994),
and private actions under state unfair competition laws.
18. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). The range of actionable
misrepresentations under the Lanham Act include product labels, direct-mail solicitations,
infomercials, and on-line advertising. For a list of representative cases, see Bruce P. Keller,
It Keeps Going and Going and Going: The Expansion of FalseAdvertising Litigation Under
the LanhamAct, 59 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoBs. 131, 146 (1996).
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Determining what constitutes a falsity has proven to be no easy
task for the courts.1 9 The consumer survey has emerged in recent
years as the most important tool for resolving that question.20 In the
view of most courts, the advertiser's targeted audience should
determine which advertising claims are misleading.2 1 A competitor
wanting to contest the misleading nature of an advertising claim
rounds up a statistically random sample of "average" Americans
and asks them how they interpret the claim in question.2 2 If enough
consumers cannot properly interpret the claim, it may be deemed
misleading." In the last half of the twentieth century the use of
consumer survey evidence in false-advertising litigation grew from
a suspect element in the larger body of plaintiff's evidence to a
required-and in some cases singular-tool.2 4 Surveys now provide
the evidentiary key to the court's determination of whether an
advertising claim that is technically true is cast under the same
legal status as a literally false claim.
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott
Laboratories' takes a step back from the prevailing judicial
affection for consumer survey evidence. By enforcing a limit on
when consumer survey evidence is admissible, the Seventh Circuit
took a judicial position that returns some common sense to
misleading advertising enforcement under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.
This Note analyzes how the role of consumer surveys developed
and what Mead Johnson may change. Following this introduction,
section two reviews the case law development leading to modern
support for the use of consumer surveys in misleading advertising
claims. The next section presents some of the ongoing problems
with the use of consumer surveys in false-advertising litigation.
Section four reviews the facts and holding of Mead Johnson.

19. See infra notes 71-74, 127-36 and accompanying text.

20. See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
21. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:180.
22. Id. § 32:158.
23. Id. § 27:55.

24. Id.
25. 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), opinion amended on denialofreh'g, 209 F.3d 1032 (7th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
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Finally, section five assesses the potential impact of Mead Johnson
on the future use of consumer surveys.
PURPOSE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LANHAM ACT

Pre-1946 Unfair Competition
Under the common law, injured competitors found virtually no
relief for false advertising.2" The earliest attempts to legislate
against false advertising provided a very limited cause of action
against competitors' unfair tactics.' The 1920 Trade-Mark Acte'
covered only advertising messages that were promoted with the
intent to deceive, and only those doing business in the locality of the
advertising were entitled to bring suit.29 With the focus on the
advertiser's intent, consumer survey evidence played virtually no
role in early false-advertising litigation.
FalseAdvertising Under the 1946 LanhamAct
In response to the need for a new federal remedy for a variety
of unfair competition problems, Congress passed Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Trademark Act."0 The Lanham Act is presently the
predominant federal law for false advertising in the United States.31
Under the Act, only those who can show a competitive injury 32thus specifically excluding misled consumers-can directly sue the
offending advertiser without going through a government entity to
do so for them.3

26. For a concise review of false advertising actions under the common law, see Lillian
R. BeVier, CompetitorSuits for FalseAdvertising UnderSection 43(a) ofthe LanhamAct: A
Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1992).
27. Trade-Mark Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533 (repealed 1946).
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Keller, supra note 18, at 131-32.
30. Paul E. Pompeo, Note, To Tell the Truth. ComparativeAdvertising and LanhamAct
Section 43(a), 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 565,568-69 (1987); Beller, supra note 6, at 923.
31. See, e.g., Ross D. Petty, The Evolution of ComparativeAdvertising Law: Has the
LanhamAct Gone Too Far?,1991 J.PuB. POLY & M=TG. 161, 161.
32. Keller, supra note 18, at 137.
33. Beller, supranote 6, at 923.
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The drafters of Lanham Act Section 43(a), considered it to be a
minor section partially codifying the common law, that also eased
the restrictive evidentiary requirements of common law falseadvertising cases. 3' At common law, claimants had to prove either
"palming off"-attempting to make customers believe that one's
own product was actually that of a competitor-or disparagementa false accusation leveled for the purpose of injuring a competitor's
business.3' The Lanham Act eased the plaintiffs burden for
3
proving palming-off and eliminated the intent requirement,
Judicial interpretations of the Act eventually expanded the range
of allowable claims, but it took a number of years--even into the
the scope of
1980s in some jurisdictions-for the courts to broaden
37
the statute beyond the pre-1946 statutory limits.

The groundwork for the expanding scope was laid in 1954 when
the Third Circuit first extended the Lanham Act's unfair competition provision to false advertising. In L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v.
Lana Lobell, Inc., the plaintiffhad advertised a dress in a national.
advertising campaign. The defendant offered an inferior dress at
less than half the price, using a picture of the plaintiffs dress in its
advertising.39 The plaintiff accused the defendant of misleading
consumers by implying that they could obtain a dress of similar
quality to the plaintiff's for less money.'0 The Third Circuit held
that the Lanham Act provided the plaintiff a cause of action for
unfair competition through false advertising."' The court found that
Congress, in adopting Section 43(a), created a federal statutory tort
similar to the common law tort of unfair competition.'2
Use of Section 43(a) exploded during the 1970s and 1980s as
plaintiffs' attorneys began pushing the courts to apply it to more
and different types of false advertising and trademark infringement

34. Gary S. Marx, Section 43(a) ofthe LanhamAct:A Statutory CauseofAction for False
Advertising, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv.383,386-87 (1983).
35. See id. at 386-87 n.9.
36. Id.
37. Keller, supra note 18, at 131-32.
38. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
39. Id. at 650.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 651-52.
42. Id. at 651; see also Walsh & Klein, supra note 15, at 409-10.
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disputes." Through judicial construction, Section 43(a) gradually
developed into the predominant means for asserting unfair
competition through false advertising."
The use of, and corresponding judicial reaction to, consumer
survey evidence grew with Lanham Act false advertising litigation.
The courts' initial reaction to the concept of consumer survey
evidence was less than enthusiastic. The Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission' is representative of the cautious approach to survey evidence during the early
years of Lanham Act Section 43(a) litigation:
It may well be that an accurate estimate of public opinion or
practice can be obtained by a sampling process or survey, but
the record is devoid of information on this subject and in the
absence of the proof of the scientific principles, if any, which
underlie the practice, we must rely upon the impression which
the advertisements would be likely to make upon the mind of a
man of ordinary intelligence.46
FalseAdvertisingAfter the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
Prior to 1988, Section 43(a) did not contain express language
about false advertising. Because of this distinction, some courts
were reluctant to apply this Section beyond the traditional misuse
of trademark claims. 47 In other jurisdictions, Section 43(a) was
deemed only applicable to false claims targeting an "inherent
quality or characteristic" of a product."
With the 1988 revision of Section 43(a), Congress sought to
clarify some of the restrictive interpretations the statute had

43. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 27-28.

44. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, LanhamAct § 43(a): The Sleeping GiantisNow
Wide Awake, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1996) ("Today section 43(a) is the preeminent
federal law for asserting claims in private litigation against ... fake advertising and product
disparagement.") (citation omitted).
45. 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
46. Id. at 60-61; see also Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429, 433 (7th
Cir. 1943) ("In the view we take of this record, all of the plaintiffs evidence obtained by the
surveys could be disregarded, and the court would still be correct in the conclusion it
reached.").
47. See Keller, supranote 18, at 133.
48. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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developed in the courts.4 9 The Section now expressly applies to all
false claims about goods and services. Section 43(a)(2) prohibits any
"false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which ... in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services,
or commercial activities.""0 By holding defendants liable for
misrepresentations concerning another person's products or
services, Congress eliminated priorjudicial interpretations, such as
the "inherent characteristic" requirement of Fur Information &
Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc. 1 and Bernard
FoodIndustries,Inc. v. Dietene Co.,2 drawing a distinction between
advertising claims about the advertiser's own products and those of
its competitors. 3
Most false comparative advertising cases are now based on
Section 43(a)54 because, with the exception of Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) intervention or industry self-regulation, such
actions are 55
the only effective remedy against false comparative
advertising.
THE GROWING USE AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSUMER
SURVEYS
Traditionally, plaintiffs in Section 43(a) suits sought simple
injunctive relief, 6 but the tide began to turn in 1986 when the
49. See Keller, supranote 18, at 133-36.
50. 15 U.S.C. § l125(a)(1XB) (1994).
51. 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974).
52. 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969).

53. In E.F. Timme, 501 F.2d 1048, the court held that Section 43(a) applied only to
misrepresentations relating to the inherent qualities of a defendant's own goods; thus false
innuendos about a competitor's products were not actionable. "[It seems quite obvious that
its purpose was to prevent false descriptions of the goods being offered. ... Congress could
hardly have intended to flood the federal courts with claims that an advertiser had
misrepresented the social desirability of its products or disparaged the ecological sensitivity
of its competitors." Id. at 1051-52. Similarly, in BernardFood, the court stated that the
Lanham Act "does not embrace misrepresentations about a competitor's product but only
false or deceitful representations which the manufacturer or merchant makes about his own
goods or services." BernardFood, 415 F.2d at 1284.
54. Keller, supranote 18, at 135.
55. Walsh & Klein, supra note 15, at 408.
56. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. VoluntaryPurchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695,706
(5th Cir. 1981) (limiting appellant's relief under state law to the same level of injunctive
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a $40 million
damage award in U-Haul's Section 43(a)(1)(B) suit against a
little-known competitor, Jartran 7 The ability to use Section
43(a)(1)(B) claims as a commercial weapon against competitors'
advertising claims has furthered the explosion of cases brought
under the Lanham Act.5" What had originally appeared to be a
minor section in a federal trademark statute quickly became a
powerful legal force for advertisers to wield against their
competitors.5 9
The Key Element: FalseRepresentation
In interpreting the Lanham Act, the courts have devised five
basic elements that underlie a successful false advertising claim
under Section 43(a)(1)(B), which may be summarized as follows:
(1) the advertiser made a false representation of fact about its
own or a competitor's product,
(2) the representations actually deceived a substantial portion
of the target audience,
(3) the deception is material (i.e., likely to influence consumer
purchasing),
(4) the advertising caused the representation to enter interstate
commerce, and
(5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured by the false
representation."
relief provided under federal law); Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800,
810 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting an injunction and recall of infringing mattress pads); Leon
Finkler, Inc. v. Schlussel, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 433,434 (2d Cir. 1979) (granting a permanent
injunction against a diamond dealer who claimed a competitor's diamonds as his own).
57. U-Haul Intl v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 1986), affg in partand
rev'g in part 601 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Ariz. 1984); BeVier, supranote 26, at 1; see also ALPO
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194,216-17 (D.D.C. 1989) (awarding ALPO
$10.4 million in damages for Ralston Purina's advertising campaign falsely claiming Ralston
Puppy Chow could lessen the severity of canine hip dysplasla), rev'd on othergrounds, 913
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
58. JeanWegman Burns, ConfusedJurisprudence:FalseAdvertising
UndertheLanham
Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 809-10 (1999).
59. Id. at 808.
60. BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Lambert Publ'g, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320 (S.D.
Ala. 1999); accordJohnson &Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d. Cir. 1994); Telxon Corp. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 961 F.
Supp. 1113,1123 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Despite the 1988 legislative changes to Section 43(a), the
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Disputes over advertising claims often come down to one
dispositive issue: false representation.6 The other four elements of
a given claim are frequently uncontested 2 because once the courts
are convinced that an advertiser has made or implied a false
statement of fact, they tend to treat the other four requirements as
mere formalities." For this reason, and for the purposes of this
Note and its focus on survey use in determining misleading advertising, only the two-pronged issue of false representation is under
consideration.
Two types of false representation provide a cause of action under
the Lanham Act: advertising that contains literally false claims
and advertising that, although literally true on its face, is perceived
by a portion of the targeted market as making an implicit claim
that can be proven false. 6 In other words, beyond restricting
outright falsity, judicial doctrine under the Lanham Act prohibits
advertisers from misleading consumers with half-truths. (For
clarity of discussion, the former will be referred to as a "false claim"
and the latter as a "misleading claim.") The distinction between the

five elements of the cause of action have not changed significantly in over 25 years. E.g., Skil
Corp. v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783-84 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
61. See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272,276-79 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that proof of diverted sales is not required to warrant an injunction when the
depictions of consumer test results are significantly misleading); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194,214 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'donothergrounds, 913 F.2d 958
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that once an advertising claim is found to be materially false, the
materiality element may be presumed).
62. Walsh & Klein, supranote 15, at 415.
63. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 92-93, 97 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that likelihood ofharm to plaintiffwas established without evidence of actual
loss, since scientific evidence showed defendant's claims of effectiveness were false); Cottrell,
Ltd. v. Biotrol Intl, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court's
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on grounds that plaintiff could "by
consumer surveys or other means [show] that [defendant]'s advertising is likely to confuse
or actually confuses consumers," which would make the plaintiffs claim "as damaging for
Lanham Act purposes as an express false claim of EPA approval"); BeVier, supra note 26, at
27-29 ("Once they are convinced that defendant has made (or implied) a false statement of
fact, courts tend to give but pro forma attention to whether the other requirements of the [H
test have been met."); cf American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons
v. American Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that
there was no showing of the lower court's abuse of discretion because the appellee failed to
present any consumer survey evidence).
64. 2 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARKPROTECTIONAND PRACTICE

7-36 to 7-42 (2000).
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two types of claims generally determines whether consumer survey
evidence will play a role in the litigation.
A false representation analysis requires two distinct inquiries.
First, what is the advertiser's message? Second, is that message
false or misleading?65 Courts frequently turn to survey data to
determine whether a particular advertisement has a tendency to
mislead. 6 As a result, an advertisement that is literally true may
still violate Section 43(a) if the plaintiff can show that consumers
received a false impression about a competitor's product.6 7
Section 43(a) covers "innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous suggestions' evidenced by the consuming public's misapprehension of the hard facts underlying the advertisement.""
Simply put, the Act "encompasses more than literal falsehoods."6 9
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the scope
of the Lanham Act extends beyond literal falsehoods so as to not
"shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protection
against such sophisticated deception is most needed." 0
Determining the distinction between a literally false claim and
a true but misleading claim is not an easy matter.7 1 The current
judicial construction requires a court to determine either: (1) what
is the advertisement's actual meaning, or (2) whether a reasonable
person would think that a factual statement had been made.'
The courts thus are forced to identify one single meaning of an
65. Walsh & Klein, supranote 15, at 413.
66. Id. at 414.
67. See, e.g., Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724,729-30 (N.D.
Ga. 1991) (holding that consumers received a false impression when a claim that was based
on the dictionary definition of "catastrophic failure" was not the commonly understood
meaning for the targeted audience); see also DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE
LANHAM ACT 199-201 (1993).
68. Vidal Sassoon Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978)).
69. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theaters, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867, 874 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. d. (1995); Keller,
supranote 18, at 141 ("Section 43(a) also prohibits claims that, even if not literally false, still
have a tendency to deceive or mislead.").
70. American Home Prods.Corp., 577 F.2d. at 165.
71. See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the Lanham Act plaintif's burden for proving literal falsity and that the proof
sufficient to meet the burden will vary depending upon the words of the challenged
advertisement).
72. BeVier, supranote 26, at 37.

428

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:417

advertising claim-a claim that may be intentionally ambiguous7 3
-and then determine if this meaning is consonant with reality.74
When an advertisement is not deemed literally false, the plaintiff
must support its claim with evidence indicating that the public will
be or has been deceived." It is here that survey evidence comes into
play. 6 There may be few instances of consumer complaints about
a particular advertisement that would serve as evidence in court,
but survey evidence is a ready substitute for actual instances of
consumer deception.77 In federal courts, at least, proof of consumer
deception almost always comes in the form of consumer surveys."
73. See, e.g., Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (S.D. Ind.
1999), rev'd,201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing the defendant's advertising claim "1st
Choice of Doctors" as 'ingeniously ambiguous").
74. As one commentator stated:
[Clourts seem to conceptualize this interpretive task as involving a dichotomous
choice-an ad means either this or that-and an essentially factual
determination that can be resolved by resorting to dictionary definitions (when
the claim is "explicit") or to consumer surveys (when it is "implied"). They have
not, in other words, recognized that the interpretive choice is not merely
between this or that meaning, but is between this meaning or a number of
other possible meanings, allof which are plausibly conveyed by a single ad, and
each ofwhich is different from but not necessarily inconsistent with the others.
BeVier, supra note 26, at 37 (citation omitted).
75. McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991);
Keller, supra note 18, at 141.
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. d. (1995).
77. See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134,1146 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that consumer survey evidence was adequate evidence for a jury to conclude that
plaintiffs suffered actual damage); PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d
266, 271 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Actual consumer confusion often is demonstrated through ...
circumstantial evidence, e.g. consumer surveys or consumer reaction tests."); Keller, supra
note 18, at 145 (stating that consumer survey evidence "is viewed most properly, however,
as a surrogate for unsolicited examples of actual confusion").
78. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Corp., 577 F.2d 160,165 (2d Cir.
1978) (requiring survey evidence if an advertisement is not false on its face); Tyco Indus. v.
Lego Sys., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1030 (D.N.J. 1987) (indicating that where the issue is
whether "true statements are misleading or deceptive despite their truthfulness, it is not
enough to place statements alone before the Court. The plaintiff must adduce evidence
(usually in the form of market research or consumer surveys) showing how the statements
are perceived by those who are exposed to them.') (quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517,527 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)); Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group,
658 F. Supp. 1103, 1112 (D.N.J. 1987) (noting that survey evidence is critical because, if an
advertisement is not false on its face, whether it is misleading "must be resolved by
reference to representative reactions of the trade and consuming public"); see alsoAvis Rent
a Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[Wlhen the claim is that a
literally true statement has a tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive, evidence must be
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Consumer surveys thus are applicable only to implicitly deceptive
advertising-when the advertising claim in question is literally7 true
9
but there is a legitimate dispute about its ultimate meaning.
Consumer Surveys in Practice
Assuming a case clears the court's initial hurdle by avoiding a
"false-on-its-face" finding, the opposing parties enter the enigmatic
realm of consumer survey evidence, referred to by the skeptical as
"lies, damn lies, and statistics."80
The Evidentiary Weight of ConsumerSurveys
In some courts it does not matter whether the trier of fact
perceives an advertisement as false or misleading, evidence of
consumer reaction is the important element. 8 ' Other courts place
less emphasis on surveys but still require that the parties at least
consider obtaining consumer samples.82
Judges and juries have placed increasing reliance on the results
of consumer surveys as the "science" of consumer research has
advanced.' As a result, in the past decade, "surveys offered as
evidence in deceptive advertising matters appear almost never to
introduced to show what the person to whom the advertisement was addressed found to be
the message.").
Judicial statements, such as the following, can raise the question of whether the courts
have begun to lose perspective on the intended purpose of consumer surveys: "[i1t would not
be appropriate for this court to rely upon such ambiguous concepts as 'common sense' or its
own intuitive notions of how an advertising statement should have been interpreted .... The
relevant barometer is the opinion of the consumer, not that of the court." 2 GULSON &
LALONDE, supra note 64, at 7-37 n.71.1 (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. United States
Postal Serv., 40 F. Supp. 2d 943, 955 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)).
79. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1278,1319 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd inpartand vacated inpart,781 F.2d 198 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 2 GIsON& LALONDE,
supra note 64, at 7-39; Jacob Jacoby et al., Survey Evidence in DeceptiveAdvertising Cases
under the LanhamAct: An HistoricalReview of Comments from the Bench, 84 TRADEMARK
REP. 541, 549 (1994).
80. See supranotes 1, 12-13.
81. E.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, 614 F. Supp. at 1319 (requiring production of "specific
scientific survey evidence of consumer reaction); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:158
(discussing the need to evaluate "the subjective mental associations and reactions of
prospective purchasers").
82. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:158.
83. Jacoby et al., supra note 79, at 550.
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be rejected,"8 ' although courts vary in the weight they give surveys.
Jacoby et al. conducted an interesting analysis of the credence
levels accorded to survey evidence in federal deceptive advertising
cases between 1953 and 1993.' In seventy-seven percent of the
cases where consumer survey evidence was allowed, the court gave
it at least moderate, if not considerable, weight. 6
In the Second Circuit, the court has held survey evidence is not
explicitly required to prove consumer deception." Even in that
jurisdiction, however, failure to use survey evidence in litigation
can be fatal to a party's case.8 In some cases, courts routinely
accept survey evidence and then critique the survey itself.8 9 Other
courts first will examine the survey defects and then decide
whether the survey is admissible evidence.9" The overwhelming
trend has been to favor admission of survey evidence and then
consider how purported defects in the survey should impact the
weight of its evidence on the overall analysis. 9'
The Standard:What ConstitutesMisled Consumers?
The federal circuits have no single standard for determining
whether a given survey proves the existence of consumer
confusion. 92 At what point does "deception" become actionable?
When does a survey prove deception? What percentage of
consumers must be confused in order for there to be a violation of
84. Id. at 549.

85. Id. at 544.
86. Id. at 550.
87. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming a
preliminary injunction for a trade dress infringement claim).
88. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32F.3d 690,697 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing
to accept an "advertising linkage" argument in place of survey evidence); Beth Vanstrom,
Note, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc.: The Role Of Consumer Surveys in the
PursuitofTruthful Advertising, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 155, 162-63 (1997) ("The significance of
the Second Circuit's decision in Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Cosprophar,Inc. was in the
importance placed on consumer surveys. The court emphasized the use of consumer surveys
and market studies to supply the causative link between the advertising and the plaintiff s

potential lost sales.") (citation omitted).
89. See Ira J. Levy, FalseAdvertisingSurveys:Recent Seventh CircuitRuling Challenges
When They May Be Needed, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 2000, at S6.

90. Id.
91. Id. But ef. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 238 (2d Cir. 1999) (opening the
door for excluding a survey if it does not meet the requisite trustworthiness standard).
92. See Keller, supra note 18, at 141-42.
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Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act? While there are no specific
answers to these questions, there is general agreement that a
competent survey showing that the number of deceived consumers
is "not insignificant" will be sufficient proof of confusion." But the
"not insignificant" standard leaves courts plenty of room for
continued variation. In the Southern District of New York, for
example, there is no need for a majority of consumers to have been
deceived, 9 and the percentage of deceived consumers could be as
low as fifteen percent.95
The variance in courts' use of survey evidence leaves them open
to continued skepticism. Professor McCarthyhas suggested that the
credence a judge places in a given survey is more a factor of the
judge's predetermined notions than of a survey's statistical
accuracy.96 Furthermore, without a clear standard, defendants are
left at the mercy of the judge. Judge Haight's assessment of the
state of the law is telling- "The ads are misleading because a district
judge has said that they are. If an appeal had been taken and the
circuit judges-or two ofthem, for that matter-had disagreed, then
the ads would have instantly shed their misleading character and
become pure as the driven snow."
Survey Use Gets Out of Hand
Frequent reliance on two opinions in the Southern District of
New York-American Brands,Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.9"

93. U-Haul Intl, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Ariz. 1984), affd in
part and rev'd inpart, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986); see also G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 1989) (requiring a significant
likelihood ofconfusion to prevail on plaintiffs unfair competition claim); IDV North Am., Inc.
v. S & M Brands, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 815, 829 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding evidence of a
significant percentage of confused survey participants is proof tending to show a likelihood
of confusion).
94. EasternAirIhnes, Inc. v. NewYorkAirLines, Inc., 559F. Supp. 1270,1280 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
95. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 740,744 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
96. See 4 MCCARTHY, supranote 5, § 32:196 (discussing two categories of survey cases:
'[A] survey is accepted and relied upon when the judge already has his or her mind made up
in favor of the survey results; and a survey is rejected and torn apart when the judge
subjectively disagrees with the survey results.") (citation omitted).
97. Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Intl, 580 F. Supp. 634, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
98. 413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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and McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp.,99-led to an
overemphasis of survey evidence in false advertising claims.' In
American Brands, Judge Lasker wrote, "the court's reaction is at
best not determinative and at worst irrelevant. The question in
such cases is-what does the person to whom the advertisement is
addressed find to be the message?"0 I The Lasker-drafted McNeilab
opinion in 1980 gave an even stronger reason to believe surveys
were essential in showing consumer confusion:
[Where ...the issue is whether true statements are misleading
or deceptive despite their truthfulness, it is not enough to place
the statements alone before the court. The plaintiff must
adduce evidence (usually in the form of market research or
consumer surveys) showing how the statements are perceived
by those who are exposed to them. 102
Judge Lasker and others also recognized that market surveys are
not the best means to identify whether consumers are misled'
Survey evidence is only a substitute for unsolicited examples of
actual confusion.l' Otherwise a court's reliance on consumer survey
evidence requires plaintiffs to satisfy a higher burden of production
in Section 43(a) false advertising cases than in other unfair
competition challenges. 0 5
In recent years, however, the evaluation of consumer confusion
has focused almost solely on the results of surveys.' 6 The absence
99. 501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
100. See Keller, supranote 18, at 142-43.
101. American Brands, 413 F. Supp. at 1357.
102. McNeilab, 501 F. Supp. at 525.
103. Id. (recognizing that the court must also rely on its own understanding of human
nature and that survey evidence is not binding on the court). See Keller, supra note 18, at
143.
104. See Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stating that consumer surveys may be a demonstration of actual consumer confusion); PPX
Enters., Inc. v. AudiofidelityEnters., Inc., 818 F.2d266, 271 (2d Cir. 1987) (notingthat actual
consumer confusion is frequently demonstrated through the use of direct evidence, or
through circumstantial evidence, such as consumer surveys or consumer reaction tests);
Keller, supranote 18, at 145.
105. Keller, supra note 18, at 145.
106. See, e.g., Herbko Intl, Inc., v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 322, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (requiring that a plaintiff must ordinarily present a consumer survey to prove
confusion and deception); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409,
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of survey evidence in a false advertising case can now be considered
a material factor in itself.10 7 The court in Avis Rent a Car Systems,
Inc. v. Hertz Corp."°8 said, "when the claim is that a literally true
statement has a tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive, evidence
must be introduced to show what the person to whom the
advertisement was addressed found to be the message."10 9 The
reasoning is circular. Consumer survey evidence is required for true
statements that have a tendency to mislead, but that tendency
cannot be determined without a consumer survey.
A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: MEAD JOHNSON

The Seventh Circuit took a step away from the current judicial
reasoningin decidingMead Johnson& Co. v. Abbott Laboratories.110
Mead Johnson involved an advertising dispute between the two
heavyweights ofthe infant formula industry: Abbott Labs's Similac
brand and Mead Johnson's Enfamil brand. At issue was the
advertising flag "1st Choice of Doctors""' included on the label of
each package of Similac baby formula. The Similac advertising
claim was based on results from a national survey of pediatricians
that showed more doctors recommend Similac than any other baby
formula. Enfamil conducted similar surveys in an unsuccessful
attempt to discredit the Similac claim, followed by additional
consumer surveys to show that the Similac claim deceived
consumers. The nuances of the survey statistics formed the basis of
the dispute and the basis for the district court's opinion." 2
1427-28 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that the misleading nature of a challenged advertising
claim was not established without evidence of how the relevant market perceived the claim).
107. See Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d Cir.
1990); BellSouth Adver. & Publg Corp. v. Lambert Publ'g, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1321 (S.D.
Ala. 1999); Warren Corp. v. Goldwert Textile Sales, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); see also Jacobyet al., supranote 79, at 550 (noting that courts tend to give weight not
according to the interpretation of survey results, but rather according to the validity ofusing
survey results).
108. 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 386.
110. 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), opinionamended on denial of reh'g,209 F.3d 1032 (7th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
111. Id. at 1034.
112. See Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind. 1999), rev'd,
201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir.
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In accordance with prior case law for misleading but not literally
false claims, z1 ' the district court required Mead Johnson to prove
what messages consumers actually received from the "1st Choice of
Doctors" claim.' All the studies provided by both Mead Johnson
and Abbott showed a clear doctor preference for Similac over
Enfamil."' Mead Johnson, however, argued that the "1st Choice of
Doctors" claim is misleading because consumers inferred two false
messages. First, most consumers believed the claim indicated that
a substantial majority of doctors prefer Similac to other brands.' 1 6
In fact, however, most studies indicated Similac maintained a
plurality of doctors'registered preference."1 Second, the"1st Choice
of Doctors" claim implied to consumers that doctors prefer Similac
to other brands because of its medical superiority for infants."' In
fact, there may be a variety of reasons for doctors to recommend
Similac over other brands, including cost, availability, and name
recognition." 9
The court reviewed numerous studies assessing the percentage
of doctors who really preferred Similac (and why they did). There
was evidence from only one survey-sponsored by Mead Johnsonto assess the actual consumer perception of the advertising claim."2
After a review of numerous critiques of the various studies, the
district court found Mead Johnson's argument convincing. Thus, the
court granted a preliminary injunction against the use of Abbott's
claim.
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook,
reversed, commenting that "[wihen the absolute level of preference
for the leading product is high, and the difference in support from
the medical profession substantial, it is all but impossible to call the

2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
113. See id. at 882 (citing case law from the Second, Third and Seventh Circuits); see also
supranotes 81-97 and accompanying text.
114. Mead Johnson, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
115. See id. at 894-903 (discussing the various surveys of doctors, in which every survey
showed there was a greater number of doctors preferring Similac than preferring any other
brand).
116. Id. at 889 (showing 84% of consumers interpreted the claim in this way).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 882.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 887.
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claim of 'first choice' misleading."12 ' The court rejected the survey
and ruled that
Mead Johnson had submitted to prove confusion
2
there was no need for consumer evidence at all.
The Court ofAppeals was specifically concerned about the ability
of competitors to structure a consumer survey in a manner that
inherently would lead to a majority of consumers registering
confusion." The court found that the district court erred in
relying on the Mead Johnson-sponsored survey results because "the
survey was bound to produce a misleading if not meaningless
answer. "124 Whereas surveys are an acceptable way to probe for
consumer confusion, "never before has survey research been used
to determine the meaning of words."'2 5 The court urged that
linguistic interpretations be left to those professionally employed in
the art of evaluating the meaning of words, not to "the first
impressions of people on the street."126
Despite the Court of Appeals' claim that survey research should
not be used to determine the meaning of words, other courts outside
the Seventh Circuit have done just that. For example, in Energy
Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems, Inc.,127 the defendant's
comparative advertisement claimed that the competitor's product
was subject to "catastrophic failure."12 ' The plaintiff produced

evidence that the relevant medical community generally understood
catastrophic failure to mean "a failure resulting in serious equipment damage or patient injury. " 9 The defendant contested by
using the definition of catastrophic failure found in an engineering
dictionary: a sudden failure not associated with typical wear.13 The
court ruled the advertisement was literally false, rejecting the
121. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 884 (7th Cir. 2000), opinion
amended on denial ofreh'g,209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
122. Id. at 885-86 ("[Clonsumers' sketchy understanding of science means that survey
results are apt to present firms with unrealistic demands for verification.").
123. Id. at 887.
124. Id. at 885.
125. Id. at 886. But see Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724,72930 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (using survey research to reject an engineering dictionary's meaning of
the words "catastrophic failure"); see also infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
126. Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886.
127. 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
128. Id. at 729.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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dictionary definition because there was "no evidence that the
dictionary definition reflected a common understanding among
targeted consumers."' 3 ' In other words, the court selected one of two
plausible meanings for the ad and then based their finding of literal
falsity on that selection.
3 2 refused
The Seventh Circuit's revised opinion inMeadJohnson"
to follow a similar line of reasoning, concluding that an advertising
claim that is factually supported cannot be misleading, even if not
understood by a majority of consumers." The revised Seventh
Circuit opinion draws a distinction between a "misleading" claim
and a claim that is "misunderstood."" Only the former provides1 a5
legal cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Noting that the Mead Johnson survey had a tendency to mislead,
the court concluded it was indeterminate whether the source of the
consumer confusion was the "1st Choice of Doctors" claim or the
survey itself.3 6
Following the Mead Johnson holding eliminates the use of
consumer surveys in cases when there is no evidence of consumer
confusion except in a competitor's survey. The Seventh Circuit
emphasized that their holding did not seek to alter the currently
accepted judicial notion that there is a distinction between false
and misleading claims.3 7 Instead, they attempted to set limits
on plaintiffs' ability to show evidence of consumer confusion as
support for their accusation that a competitor's advertisement was
misleading.' The decision essentially added a previously unwritten
restraint to misleading advertising litigation. After Mead Johnson,
lower courts in the Seventh Circuit should no longer need to weigh
131. Id. at 729-30.
132. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 917 (2000), amending 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 1034 ("[Ilnterpreting 'misleading' to include factual propositions that are
susceptible to misunderstanding would make consumers as a whole worse offby suppressing
truthful statements that will help many of them find superior products.").
134. Id at 1034 ("'Misleading' is not a synonym for 'misunderstood,' and this record does
not support a conclusion that Abbott's statements implied falsehoods about Similac.").
135. See id.
136. Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 885.
137. MeadJohnson,209 F.3d at 1034 ("None of this calls into question the understanding,
expressed by many decisions, that whether a claim is either 'false' or'misleading' is an issue
of fact rather than law.").
138. Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886.
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consumer survey evidence where the text of a claim is literally true
and "objectively verifiable.""3 9
IMPACT AND PROJECTIONS IN THE WAKE OF MEAD JOHNSON
The Seventh Circuit's distinction between "misleading" and
"misunderstood" claims entails a fundamental shift in how false
advertising cases should be tried. 40 The distinction between the two
concepts is an apparently minor linguistic nuance that could have
a significant impact on litigation.
The ruling by the Seventh Circuit establishes a much-needed
limit in judicial doctrine on the role of consumer survey evidence in
Section 43(a) false advertising litigation. With Lanham Act suits
increasingly being used as a commercial weapon, Mead Johnson
takes a small but important step in defining to what extent a
company can challenge a competitor's advertising claims.
Prior to Mead Johnson, even truthful advertising claims could be
challenged if a competitor could sponsor a survey showing consumer
confusion. 4 2 In the Seventh Circuit, another restraint now exists:
common sense. The court held that "'our fundamental conclusion is
that a producer cannot make a factual issue just by conducting
surveys."" m
The Seventh Circuit's ruling, if followed, can make a significant
impact on the judicial landscape. Evaluating the Mead Johnson
holding in light of four factors-judicial consistency, consumer
protection, clarity for advertisers, and congressional intent-reveals
some of the reasons the Seventh Circuit's position is an improvement over the dominant judicial construction for misleading
advertising cases.

139. Id.
140. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 531 U.S. 917
(2000) (No. 00-0071); Levy, supra note 89, at S6.
141. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
143. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000), amending 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000).
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JudicialConsistency
Reliance on consumer surveys has lead to inconsistent results in
court, as will be shown by consideration of representative cases
from the Second and Eighth Circuits. A brief review of these cases
and an analysis of the same facts under the standard of Mead
Johnson will demonstrate the advantage of the Seventh Circuit's
decision.
First, consider the Second Circuit case Avis Rent a CarSystems,
Inc. v. Hertz Corp.,' which addressed a controversy over the claim
"'Hertz has more new cars than Avis has cars."145 Part of Avis'
Section 43(a) challenge to the Hertz claim was that, contrary to the
advertisement's plain meaning, Avis did own more total cars than
Hertz had new cars. 46 As was the case in Mead Johnson,each word
of the Hertz claim had an objectively verifiable definition. In
reversing the lower court, however, the Second Circuit held that the
objective meaning of the claim was not as important as the survey
that showed consumers assumed Hertz's claim applied only to Avis
cars available for rent.'47 Over six-thousand cars that Avis owned
but were unavailable for rent were discounted from the comparison;
Hertz's claim was thus held not to be misleading.
A second representative case, United IndustriesCorp. v. Clorox
Co., 148 analyzed a similarly objectively verifiable claim that

defendant's product Maxattrax "Kills Roaches in 24 Hours." 4 9 As
in the Hertz case, the appellate court-this time the Eighth Circuit
-looked beyond the literal meaning of the claim. Although true
that roaches that came in contact with the product died within
twenty-four hours, Clorox contended that consumers would believe
the product would "completely control an infestation by killing all
of the roaches in one's home within 24 hours, while its competitors
will fail to do the same." 5 ' Clorox's argument was rejected because
it was not supported by consumer survey evidence and, therefore,
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 384-85.
140 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1183.

20011

LIES, DAMN LIES, AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING

439

did not show a likelihood of success on the merits.' 51 In other words,
even though the claim was objectively true, the Court was willing
to let consumer reaction evidence decide whether an injunction was
to be enforced.
The Second and Eighth Circuit opinions support the prevailing
judicial notion that literally true claims-regardless of objective
verifiability--can be shown to be misleading by consumer survey
evidence. The focus of the judicial inquiry is not the challenged
advertisement, but rather the sufficiency of survey evidence. Under
a Mead Johnson analysis, the claim by Hertz would be examined
only for objective content, because the ad was not literally true, and
the outcome of the case would be the opposite. In UnitedIndustries,
the court was willing to apply similar reasoning as in the Hertz
case. Despite the objectively verifiable claim, the court was willing
to declare the ad likely to be misleading if Clorox could have shown
a significant percentage of consumers believed Clorox's proffered
interpretation.
As the Seventh Circuit suggested in Mead Johnson, survey
results are a malleable standard.'52 Despite the increasingly
accepted scientific methodology of survey research," 3 the results of
surveys are still subject to influential nuances of the survey
sponsor. The various survey results used to argue the validity of
Abbott Labs' "1st Choice of Doctors" claim is just one present
example." Under the prevailing approaches, courts are tied to
interpreting the validity of proffered survey evidence rather than
the validity of the advertising claims at issue. Use of the Mead
Johnson analysis prevents such distractions.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis for misleading advertising is at
odds with the other circuit courts. When literally true claims are
at issue, defending advertisers will pursue the Mead Johnson'
"objectively verifiable" standard, while competitor-plaintiffs will
151. Id.
152. Mead Johnson &Co.v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883,885 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Respondents
in survey research are suggestible ...."), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 201 F.3d 1032

(7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
153. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind.
1999) (discussing various percentages of surveyed doctors that expressed a preference for
Similac or Enfamil), rev'd, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), opinionamended on denialofreh'g,
201 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
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seek the more common blanket acceptance of consumer survey use.
Forum shopping is a predictable result. 155 Although clarification
by the Supreme Court would resolve the split, the Court declined
to review Mead Johnson's appeal." 6 So for the present, the
Mead Johnson standard becomes just another interesting
landmark in the inconsistent judicial landscape. If applied in all
jurisdictions, however, the case provides hope for a workable,
consistent standard.
Consumers'Need for Protection
In reviewing the place of the consumer in misleading advertising
claims, there are at least two factors, often ignored by the courts,
that limit the need for the prevalent survey-based judicial
construction of Section 43(a): the consumer's ability to protect
herself--either by initial disbelief or by not making a repeat
purchase-and the advertiser's parallel incentive not to try to
deceive her.'" In this age of excessive advertising, where businesses, politicians, and lobbyists are all trying to get the most out
of every truthful advantage they can muster, advertising"spin" and
consumer skepticism climb accordingly.'58
The fact that consumers may not understand the correct
implications of an advertising claim does not necessarily injure
either the consumer or the competitor. Few consumers in today's
society are totally without skepticism toward advertising
assertions.'r 9 It is not unreasonable to expect them to generally
discount advertisers' claims. 60 Further, advertising claims will
155. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 531 U.S. 917
(2000) (No. 00-0071) (claiming that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mead Johnsonrenders
evidence of consumer confusion "legally irrelevant").
156. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 531 U.S. 917 (2000).
157. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 26, at 33-34 (discussing the market-driven incentive of
"self-interested repeat players" to avoid deceptive advertising because consumers can
retaliate by not making further purchases).
158. See, e.g., Let's Work Together,FOOD ENG'GINTVL, Sep. 1, 2000, at 9, availableat 2000
WL 21427875 ("Consumer skepticism is a difficult nut to crack, and those who are developing
new products ... will have to be careful how they formulate their products, and what claims
they make for them.").
159. BeVier, supranote 26, at 8.
160. Whereas consumer reaction surveys typically focus on how consumers would
interpret a given claim, the issue of whether the consumer actually believes that claim is
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always be subject to misinterpretation, 1 1 and the only way to
entirely avoid
misleading advertising is to ban advertising
1 62
completely.

Skepticism provides a self-regulating element to the advertising
market by encouraging advertisers not to waste resources on
implausible claims. 6 ' Because the market contains inherent
deterrents to false advertising, the consumer benefit in allowing
rivals to have a private remedy against their competitors is
negligible. 164 "Not only do [courts] appear to believe that purging
the marketplace of false inferences is costless, but they lack faith
in the discernment and intelligence of consumers."'65
The holding in Mead Johnsoninherently reduces the role of the
judiciary in protecting consumers from misleading advertising and
so makes the market's inherent consumer-protection measures
more important. In terms of judicial economy this is a practical
step: courts need not step in where the market provides its own
remedy.
Neither the legislative purpose of the Lanham Act"s nor constitutional issues concerning free speech in commercial advertising'67
seldom investigated. Jacoby et al., supra note 79, at 546 (suggesting that surveys that seek
to measure whetherorhow muchconsumers are deceived shouldfocus onwhat the consumer
believes the advertisement says about a product, not what the consumer believes about the
product itself); BeVier, supranote 26, at 32-33 n.99 (discussing that when an impliedly false
claim is both self-interested and unverifiable it falls into a category unlikely to be completely
believed or relied upon by consumers).
161. At least some courts believe that advertising does not have to inevitably result in
some consumer misunderstanding. "Tlhe very purpose of [Section 43(a)] is to avoid ...
ambiguity." McNeilab, Inc. u. AmericanHome Prods.Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517,543 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Because some claims, such as the one inMead Johnson,involve "credence" qualities
that the typical consumer cannot verify, consumers' interests could be served by allowing
competitors to police the advertising landscape through Section 43(a) claims. Michael R.
Darby& EdiKarni,Free Competitionand the OptimalAmount ofFraud,16J.L. & ECON. 67,
69 (1973) (discussing the concept of "credence" qualities that consumers cannot costeffectively discover either by prepurchase inspection or by postpurchase experience).
162. Richard Craswell,InterpretingDeceptiveAdvertising,65 B.U.L.REv. 658,696 (1985).
163. BeVier, supra note 26, at 13 ("The rational advertisers' reaction to consumer
skepticism ... will be not to waste resources making direct, inherently unbelievable quality
claims at all--either true or false.").
164. See id. at 8.
165. Id. at 47.
166. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
167. Constitutional issues concerning free speech in commercial advertising are beyond
the scope of this Note. See Keller, supra note 18, at 149-57, for a concise discussion of the
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are furthered by the courts' continued use of surveys to determine
if consumers are misled by objectively verifiable claims. If a court's
thorough analysis determines that a challenged advertising statement is literally true and objectively verifiable, then the market will
provide adequate consumer protection.
Clarityfor Advertisers
The uncertainty of what standards the courts apply in Section
43(a) cases deters the production of truthful advertising.168
Practically, an advertiser will be reluctant to push the full
boundaries of legitimate advertising if it faces the likelihood of
substantial litigation costs. Besides creating artificial limits on
commercial speech, potential Section 43(a) actions serve as a
disincentive that limits the amount oftrue information available to
the consumer.' 69 Only a clear judicial standard can both eliminate
the artificial restraints on commercial speech and maximize the
flow of truthful advertising to the consumer. That clarity cannot be
achieved so long as the legal standard for truthful advertisements
is based on the fluctuating standard of consumer opinions.
With the ruling in Mead Johnson, advertisers in the Seventh
Circuit may now have a better idea of the legal limits: objectively
supported truthful statements.17 The Mead Johnson standard
allows advertisers to more confidently assert their claims without
the fear that competitors can create a factual dispute by sponsoring
a consumer survey. Alternatively, competitors can more accurately
assess their chances of successful legal action. Rather than funding
costly consumer surveys and litigation, factually based competitor's
claims will be challenged in the advertising marketplace. It is
true that competitors will lose the benefit of the restrictions on
issue.
168. Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note, The Risk of Chill:A Cost of the StandardsGoverning
the Regulation of FalseAdvertising underSection 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV.
339, 365-66 (1991) (discussing how advertising regulation and the accessibility of the court
system to false advertising claimants "chill (over-deter) the production of truthful
advertising").
169. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 886 (2000) (discussing how
removal of potentially misunderstood but truthful advertising language deprives
knowledgeable buyers of useful information). See generally Singdahlsen, supra note 168.
170. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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advertisers' truthful claims when the consuming public was unable
to interpret a proper meaning. The competitor, however, can still
address concerns of consumer confusion through its own advertising
campaign or through joint participation in private regulatory
groups.
Although the Mead Johnson standard provides the potential for
greater clarity, the holding will be shaped by subsequent case law.
The precise distinction between a "misleading" claim and a
"misunderstood" claim will have to be defined by future courts.17 '
The need to more adequately distinguish these concepts tempers
the accomplishment of the Seventh Circuit. The potential for a
workable standard is greater with the Mead Johnson objectively
verifiable standard, however, than prior courts have shown in
interpreting the 1988 Lanham Act revisions.

171. In the few months since it was decided, only three opinions have referred to Mead
Johnson with respect to the use ofconsumer surveys. In FirstHealth Group Corp. v. United
Payors & United Providers,Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. IM.2000), the court showed a
reluctance to view the Seventh Circuit holding as providing a significant change. In First
Health Group, the plaintiff charged that the defendant falsely represented itself as a PPO
when, in fact, the defendant's operating procedures did not strictly comply with the common
definition of a PPO. The court determined there was no literal falsity in the advertisement
and turned to the issue of whether the claim was misleading. Id. at 847. Although quoting
language from the Mead Johnson opinion, the court adhered to the traditional language of
earlier precedent cases: "Survey evidence is the customaryway of proving significant actual
deception, although consumer data, market research or evidence of diverted sales ... may"
sometimes be sufficient. Common sense and personal experience alone are not enough." Id.
at 848. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment onthe grounds that
there was no survey conducted and the other proffered evidence was insufficient to support
a misleading advertising claim. Id. at 851. The district court did not refer to Mead Johnson's
"objectively verifiable" standard for whether a survey would be needed.
The court in Clorox Co. PuertoRico v. Proctor& Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24 (1st
Cir. 2000), declined to extend the Mead Johnson holding from printed labels to television
commercials. The court recognized"a fundamental difference between a slogan on acan label
that communicates its meaning to consumers solely through the printed text, and a tag line
shown on the screen at the end of a television commercial that communicates ... through a
combination of audio-visual and textualmedia." Id. at 38. The distinction is appropriate, and
serves to show the narrowness of the Mead Johnson holding. The meaning of an objective
claim can be influenced by images, tone, or backgrounds that appear along with the
television advertisement. Television claims would therefore not be considered "objectively
verifiable" under the Mead Johnson standard. See id. at 37-38.
The court in Haymond v. Lundy, No. Civ. A. 99-5048, 2001 WL 15956 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5,
2001), followed the Seventh Circuit's distinction between a misunderstood and a misleading
statement in holding an attorney's claims that he supervised a broad range of cases were not
actionable under the Lanham Act. Id. at *4.
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Consistency with CongressionalIntent
Congress adopted the Lanham Act in general, and Section 43(a)
1 72
in particular, to protect both competitors and consumers.
Compared with the typical consumers, the greater financial interest
of competing advertisers-not to mention the greater financial
resources-make competitors the likely plaintiffs in Lanham Act
litigation. Whereas competitor suits have been a mainstay in
Lanham Act litigation, the 1988 revisions to the Act were drafted
with consumer protection also in the forefront of the discussion:
"The purpose of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 is to ...
improve the law's protection of the public from counterfeiting,
confusion, and deception." 17 Debate continues, however, on whether
enforcement of the Act can simultaneously and effectively protect
both competitors and consumers." If that balance cannot be
achieved, it is not clear whether the drafters' intent was to prefer
the rights of one group over the other.'75
From a cursory view, the Mead Johnson standard sacrifices a
previously existing level of consumer protection by disallowing
evidence of actual consumer confusion in cases where the disputed
claim can be objectively verified. Even though consumers in the
post-Mead Johnson era may be subject to more detailed or more
shaded advertising claims, the advertiser already has an economic
172. S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
173. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 1.
174. See, e.g., Walsh & Klein, supra note 15, at 412 ("A competitor's interest in fair
competition and the public's interest in truthful advertising are coterminous. Under section

43(a), therefore, a plaintiff-competitor, while vindicating its own interests, simultaneously
serves as the 'vicarious avenger of the defendant's customers.'") (citation omitted) (quoting
Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J.), rev'd
on othergrounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927)).
Although Judge Hand's opinion is still revered by many today, a number of scholars
disagree. "[T]he proper perspective from which to view the rules in section 43(a) cases is that
of the potentially deceived consumer rather than that of the possibly injured competitor."
BeVier, supra note 26, at 3; see also Craswell, supra note 162, at 684-88.
175. See, e.g., Burns, supranote 58. Jean Burns notes that:
Topping offthe confusion is the unanswered fundamental question: what is the
ultimate goal ofsection 43(a)(1)(B) as currently drafted? Is its primary purpose
competitor protection? Consumer protection? Both? ... As a result of Congress's
lack of clarity, the courts remain without guidance on the central issue in any
statutory construction: the purpose behind section 43(a).
Id. at 833-34.

20011

LIES, DAMN LIES, AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING

445

incentive to avoid consumer confusion.17 Thus, the reduction in
consumer protection under the Mead Johnson standard is insignificant. At the same time, Mead Johnson gives advertisers the
benefit of a more predictable legal standard and greater freedom to
make factually supported claims.
It appears, therefore, that the Mead Johnson holding swings
the Section 43(a) protection emphasis in favor of advertisers.
Fortunately, false advertising protection is not a zero-sum game.
Increasingprotection available to competitors, without reducing the
consumers protection in any meaningful way, is a commendable
result that fully meets the intent of the Lanham Act to benefit
both consumers and competitors. Furthermore, there is no indication that Congress ever intended the Lanham Act to become a
commercial weapon for advertisers.' Use of the Mead Johnson
standard will require plaintiffs to more carefully consider when to
challenge competitors' advertising claims. Thus, the decision reigns
in a judicial interpretation that has grown beyond the scope of the
legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION

The holding in Mead Johnson opens the door for courts to reduce
the number of instances where consumer surveys will be required
in misleading advertising cases. The Seventh Circuit's holding
breaks from the more popular judicial construction that allows
consumer surveys as evidence of confusion in misleading advertising cases regardless of the objective truth of the advertised claim.
The other circuits should follow Mead Johnson's lead. The legality
of objectively verifiable truthful advertising claims should no longer
be subjected to consumers' subjective interpretations through the
use of survey evidence.
Weighing the factors ofjudicial consistency, consumer protection,
clarity for advertisers, and congressional intent, the Seventh
Circuit's standard limiting when consumer surveys will be admitted
as evidence for misleading advertising litigation is an improvement
over other courts' unchallenged acceptance of survey evidence. By
176. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.

177. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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allowing advertisers to use all literally true, objectively verifiable
claims-regardless of survey results indicating consumer confusion-the Seventh Circuit's holding provides advertisers greater
freedom and legal predictability without sacrificing any meaningful
consumer protection. Because theMeadJohnsonstandard improves
competitor protection without sacrificing consumer protection, the
Seventh Circuit's holding fully carries out the stated purpose of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act-protecting both the consumer and
competing advertisers. The new standard will also require a change
in plaintiffs' litigation strategy of challenging factually based
advertising claims, limiting the availability of Lanham Act suits as
a commercial weapon.
In sorting through the lies, damn lies, and misleading advertising, the Seventh Circuit has led the way for a more simple,
consistent, and fair means for courts to decide false advertising
litigation-outlining a new standard other circuits should follow.

Thomas W. Edman

